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Abstract 
 
This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I 
argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates 
many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully 
compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by 
providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical 
synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of quantity. Locating my interpretation in 
relation to recent research by Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an 
attractive compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue.  
 
1. Introduction  
‘Conceptualism’ and ‘nonconceptualism’ are used across the philosophical literature in 
multiple, non-coextensive ways. Since the concern here is with Kant, I frame the debate using 
his terminology. I define nonconceptualism as the thesis that a subject may possess empirical 
intuitions of spatio-temporal particulars even if that subject entirely lacks conceptual 
capacities.
1
 I use the term ‘subject’ broadly – one key instance of such ‘subjects’ will be non-
rational animals.
2
 Let conceptualism be the thesis that nonconceptualism is false. The debate 
is also often presented in terms of perception: the conceptualist holds, and the 
nonconceptualist denies, that concepts ‘have an indispensable role’ in even ‘the mere 
perceptual presentation of particulars in empirical intuition’ (Griffith 2010:199; similarly 
Allais 2009:384). As I discuss in §2, however, care is needed here: there is an important 
difference between contemporary uses of ‘perception’ and Kant’s own employment of 
‘Perception’ and related terms. I will therefore use the definition given in terms of empirical 
intuitions. 
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 In this paper I argue for two claims: (i) that Kant is a nonconceptualist; (ii) that in the 
case of normally functioning, adult humans, however, empirical intuitions are necessarily 
subject to categorical, and thus conceptual, synthesis. My proposal is thus intended in a spirit 
of compromise - hence the article’s title. I am not literally claiming, of course, that Kant 
endorses both conceptualism and nonconceptualism; given my definitions, that would be 
contradictory. Rather, I hold that whilst he is a nonconceptualist, this position, once properly 
understood, can accommodate many of the motivations and commitments driving Kantian 
conceptualism. Let me say something more specifically about the relation between (i) and 
(ii). It is sufficient to validate nonconceptualism, as defined, if there are any subjects enjoying 
empirical intuitions in the complete absence of conceptual capacities; so nonconceptualism 
would be true if Kant understood non-rational animals (henceforth ‘animals’) in this fashion. 
But, if that were established, two vital issues would remain. First, it would be crucial to 
clarify whether only such animals could have nonconceptual intentional states. Many 
contemporary nonconceptualists assume that their arguments apply unproblematically to 
humans: Heck, for example, motivated his position by asking his – presumably human – 
readers to ‘[c]onsider your current perceptual state’ (Heck 2000:489). So we need to 
understand why, once placed in a human context, Kant believes that empirical intuitions are 
necessarily accompanied by category use: given his nonconceptualism, this cannot be a direct 
condition on empirical intuitions themselves. In short, how can (ii) be true given (i)? As I will 
explain, my view of this is quite different from that of Allais, for example. Second, there is a 
widespread assumption that Kant’s argument for the categories implies the falsity of 
nonconceptualism: As Ginsborg puts it: 
The central line of thought [in the Transcendental Deduction] is that the objective 
validity of the categories depends on their having a role to play, not just in explicit 
judgment, but also in our perceptual apprehension of the objects about which we 
judge (Ginsborg 2008:69; similarly Bowman 2011:421-2, Grüne 2011:465-6).  
If the possibility of non-categorial intuitions, what Hanna called ‘rogue’ intuitions, is to be 
admitted anywhere within the Kantian system, even for animals, the implications of that 
move for the Analytic need to be appraised (Hanna 2011:409). In short, how can (i) be true 
given (ii)?  
 The paper has two stages. First, in §2, I offer a new account of the relations between 
intuition, consciousness and perception in Kant’s work. I argue that this supports 
nonconceptualism both by fleshing out his picture of nonconceptual intentionality and by 
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clarifying the limitations which he saw as inherent in such intentionality. Second, in §§3-4, I 
focus on the categories and the principles. I argue here that nonconceptualism is compatible 
with the key thrust of the Deduction, and can thus accommodate one of the main motivations 
for conceptualism. In examining why that is the case, we will also see why normally 
functioning, adult human intentionality necessarily involves the categories.  
 Before getting underway, a few terminological and conceptual clarifications. Like 
Allais, my concern is with ‘relative nonconceptualism’, i.e. with a nonconceptualism defined 
in terms of the relation between a mental state, namely an empirical intuition, and the subject 
to whom it is ascribed (Speaks 2005:360; Allais 2009:386). I will not discuss ‘absolute 
nonconceptualism’, the thesis that there exists content which is of ‘a different kind…than 
beliefs, thoughts, and so on’ (Speaks 2005:360). I am sympathetic to the view that 
incongruent counterparts demonstrate such content, but that requires discussion of topics – 
particularly motor intentionality – to which I cannot do justice here. More specifically, my 
concern is with the relationship between relative nonconceptualism and the intentionality of 
empirical intuitions. In other words, I agree that ‘a plausible nonconceptualist interpretation 
of Kant’ needs to establish the possibility of ‘perceptual images of objects in which those 
objects are intentionally represented without being brought under concepts’ (Ginsborg 
2008:68). Mere sensory awareness is not enough. Posy makes the same point in a semantic 
idiom when he defines conceptualism as the view that ‘without categorical principles, our 
mental states cannot serve their semantic role as intuitions’ (Posy 2000:165). There are, of 
course, foundational issues regarding intentionality which I cannot address here: for example, 
whether perceptual content is Fregean, Russellian or some form of Evansian hybrid, and I 
remain neutral on these. Finally, conceptualism may take several forms. Suppose that whilst 
empirical intuitions make an irreducible contribution to intentionality, this is necessarily 
dependent on the contribution made by concepts. This would suffice to refute 
nonconceptualism as defined. One might also argue for a more radically conceptualist thesis 
whereby intuitions are actually reducible to concepts. But since the less radical, and surely 
exegetically more plausible, form of conceptualism would suffice to refute my position, I 
focus on it.  
 
2. Intentionality, Consciousness and Perception: Kant’s General Theory 
This section sets out what I will call Kant’s ‘general theory’ of intentionality, consciousness 
and perception. The theory is ‘general’ in that it outlines certain structures common to both 
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rational, sensible beings such as humans and to non-rational, sensible animals. As he puts it 
himself: 
[A]nimals also act in accordance with representations [Vorstellungen] (and are not, as 
Descartes would have it, machines), and in spite of their specific difference, they are 
still of the same genus as human beings (as living beings). (KU:464) 
My presentation of the ‘general theory’ supports nonconceptualism in two ways.  First, and 
most obviously, it helps makes sense of Kant’s thinking about the relation between humans 
and animals. As McLear observes, it is ‘fairly uncontroversial that Kant believed non-human 
animals incapable of conceptual capacities’ (McLear 2011:4). But what is striking is that 
Kant allows them far more than mere sensations. The Jäsche Logic, for example, states that 
animals are ‘acquainted with objects’ [kennen Gegenstände] and can ‘represent something in 
comparison with other things both as to sameness and as to difference’; what they lack is only 
the ability to ‘cognize’ [erkennen], a capacity which requires both intuition and concept   
(Log:64–5; KrV:A106). Elsewhere Kant suggests that an ox has an outer sense intuition of its 
stall (SvF:59), and it is obviously hard to deny that animals are capable of representing, in at 
least a simplistic manner, the spatial movements of their prey (Allais 2009:407). Second, the 
‘general theory’ clarifies aspects of Kant’s model of synthesis. This is important because that 
model is often taken to support conceptualism (for example, Posy 2000:172). Kant himself 
states that ‘all combination is an action of the understanding’ and that apperception is ‘the 
source of all combination’ (KrV:B130; cf. B134-35; KrV:B154). As I will argue in both this 
section and the next, however, the interaction between different modes of synthesis is 
significantly more nuanced than this suggests. 
 I will now set out the ‘general theory’; I then come back to its implications for 
nonconceptualism at the close of this section. 
 I begin with the empirical intuitions of outer sense: these represent ‘objects as outside 
us and all as in space’ (KrV:A22/B37). Within the set of such intuitions, Kant distinguishes 
between those which are conscious, and those which are unconscious: the latter class, he 
stresses, is the larger (Anth:136). He introduces the relevant notion of consciousness using 
the following example: if I perceive a man, I must also represent those parts that constitute 
him ‘since the representation of the whole…is composed of these partial ideas’ (Anth:135). 
However, I am not typically conscious of those parts: I may see a man’s face ‘even though I 
am not conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth etc.’ (Anth:135). Kant refers to conscious 
mental states as ‘perceptions’ (KrV:A320/B376-7).3 Intuitions which are conscious are thus 
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‘objective perceptions’, objective in that they ‘refer’ [sich beziehen] to an object 
[Gegenstand] (KrV:A320/B376-7) (I discuss the links between this formulation and talk of 
‘cognition’ at the start of §3). 
 Before proceeding, it is worth focussing on ‘perception’. In the contemporary 
literature on nonconceptualism, ‘perception’ refers to sense perception, i.e. what we hear, see, 
taste etc. Thus Heck’s injunction to ‘consider your current perceptual state’, mentioned 
above, is followed by a list of things he can see (Heck 2000:489-50). But Kant’s use is quite 
different: perception is a ‘representation with consciousness’ (KrV:A320/B376-7) and that is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for sense perception in its ordinary sense. It is not sufficient 
since a consciously occurrent thought about my house is a perception in Kant’s terms, and it 
is not necessary since visual content may, as in the Anthropology example, be unconscious 
and thus not ‘perceptual’ in the Kantian sense. Nevertheless, the two meanings are not simply 
orthogonal to each other: empirical intuitions of outer sense, for example, are roughly 
analogous to perceptions in the contemporary usage, and insofar as they are conscious these 
will also be perceptions in Kant’s sense. For clarity’s sake, however, I will use ‘perception’ 
only in its Kantian sense. 
 Kant’s distinction between conscious and unconscious representational content raises 
an obvious question: what determines what I am conscious of? This can clearly vary: most of 
us are not typically conscious of other people’s eyebrows, yet we may obviously become so 
(perhaps on reading that sentence). To answer this question, we need to turn to Kant’s 
account of time. Kant defines time as ‘nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition 
of ourself and our inner state’ (KrV:A33/B49). Time is thus one of the ‘conditions of 
receptivity of our mind’ (KrV:A77/102). To be precise, it is the form in which ‘we intuit 
ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves’ (KrV:B156, original emphasis). In 
short, ‘inner sense’ is ‘nothing but the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity’ 
(KrV:B67-8). Many issues regarding inner sense require clarification: consider the familiar 
question of whether Kant recognises a manifold of content over and above that received from 
outer sense. But what matters here is the primary claim regarding self-affection. For one clear 
instance of what Kant means, consider categorical synthesis, a spontaneous act which is both 
exercised on the spatial manifold and in which we thereby ‘intuit ourselves only as we are 
internally affected’ (KrV:B153). Crucially, in line with the doctrine of inner sense, it is this 
act of self-affection which first produces an awareness of temporal succession. 
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[W]e cannot even represent time itself without, in drawing a straight line (which has 
to serve as the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the 
action of the synthesis of the manifold…Motion, as the action of the subject (not as a 
determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space…first 
produces the concept of succession. (KrV:B154–5; similarly B292) 
Kant’s point is that it is the action of the subject, in drawing a line, which yields an awareness 
of succession. Unsurprisingly, the Analytic focuses on the sophisticated self-affection of 
rational agents. But I believe that Kant regards this basic model as applying much more 
widely. Specifically, my view is that Kant sees temporal succession in both rational and non-
rational beings as the form in which those beings intuit their own determination of the spatial 
manifold. Of course, Kant’s treatment of animals is often deeply unclear: for example, he 
occasionally denies that animals possess inner sense (V-MP-L1/Pölitz:276). I agree with 
McLear that the price of taking this kind of remark, which arises from the elision of 
apperception and inner sense, at face value is too high: inner sense is the form of time, and ‘it 
seems scarcely credible to attribute conscious awareness of any sort to animals when that 
awareness is not temporally structured’ (McLear 2011:9). But one can nevertheless discern 
Kant’s position, at least in the Critical period, fairly clearly: time is the form in which beings 
intuit self-affection, and the principal case of such self-affection is the act of changing the 
scope of conscious awareness of the spatial manifold, an act which will occur in more or less 
sophisticated guises depending on the creature involved. This is the heart of what I called 
Kant’s ‘general theory’. 
 To support this reading, I will examine two key texts; I will then spell out the 
implications for nonconceptualism. 
 The first text is the discussion of the synthesis of apprehension in the A Deduction.  
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented 
as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on 
one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything 
other than absolute unity. (KrV:A99) 
The place to begin is the final clause. As contained in ‘one moment’, the intuition is an 
‘absolute unity’: elsewhere Kant refers to it as a ‘synopsis’ ‘which contains a manifold’ 
(KrV:A97), and as a ‘quantum’, i.e. that which ‘I can cognize immediately’ (V-
MP/Dohna:630). I agree with Tolley that the ‘absolute unity’ point cannot be that intuitions 
given ‘in one moment’ are entirely unarticulated – or else, it would be impossible to instantly 
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see two things as standing next to each other (Tolley 2013:122). Rather, it is that such 
‘absolute’ empirical intuitions are not themselves products of synthesis; these empirical 
representations, for example the man standing in the field, are directly and immediately 
generated by our being affected through ‘outer sense’ (one might think, separately, that the 
pure forms of space and time depend on some synthesis; my point here concerns individual 
empirical intuitions – I return to the pure forms at the end of the section). Such an absolute or 
instantaneous intuition ‘contains a manifold in itself’ because, like all intuitions, it is 
infinitely divisible (KrV:A169/B211). However, insofar as the intuition is considered at only 
a single point in time, this manifold is ‘not represented as such’, i.e. it is present but we are 
not conscious of it – precisely as in the example of the man’s eyes in the Anthropology. The 
reason is that an awareness of the parts, i.e. a shift in the scope of conscious awareness, 
necessarily implies an awareness of succession: the manifold is thus only ‘represented as 
such’ insofar we ‘distinguish the time in the succession of impressions’ Why? The answer is 
that this is precisely the claim regarding the connection between consciousness and time that 
I discussed above: succession is the form in which we intuit our own act of ‘attention’, of 
shifting the scope of conscious awareness (KrV:B156). Conversely in the absence of an 
awareness of succession, i.e. when dealing with an intuition ‘as contained in one moment’, 
we lack consciousness of its parts. In short, the ‘synthesis of apprehension’ is the process 
whereby I come to consciously represent, i.e. to objectively perceive in the language of the 
KrV:A320/B376-7, the parts of something rather than merely to intuit them. Thus: 
[B]y the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition of the manifold of an 
empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e. empirical consciousness of it (as 
appearance), becomes possible. (KrV:B160) 
Such changes of conscious awareness are acts intuited under the form of time: thus ‘the 
apprehension of the manifold…is always successive’ (KrV:A189/B234). 
 The other text I want to adduce in support of my account is the treatment of 
magnitude in KU. There Kant begins by discussing the extent of the conscious spatial 
awareness that one has at a given instant, what one ‘can grasp at a single glance’ [in einem 
Blick fassen] (KU:254). Kant refers to this extent as the ‘basic measure’, and he gives various 
examples of it, such as an area the height of a man (KU:256). In the case of rational agents, 
shifts in the scope of such conscious awareness are partly a function of the concepts I 
possess: when I acquire the concept of racism, for example, I attend to different aspects of the 
same scene. In animals, in contrast, the scope of conscious awareness, and the shifts in it, are 
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determined by an imagination governed by natural laws (KU:251-2). We thus have two types 
of motion and two types of attention: rational and non-rational. So, as I read it, passages such 
as the following, whilst primarily concerned with apperceptive motion, are also speaking 
simultaneously of a broader phenomenon: 
I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is 
affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this (KrV: 
B156, original emphasis) 
This is precisely what I claiming: the act of attention, of focussing in, which may take more 
or less sophisticated forms, affects inner sense, resulting in an awareness of succession 
KrV:B67-8). To put it another way, the ‘motion of the subject’, the act of shifting the scope 
of consciousness, may be more or less determined : in non-rational agents, ‘motion’ is caused 
by natural laws, whilst in rational agents it may be self-initiated to a greater degree 
(spontaneity) or even to an absolute degree (autonomy). 
 Suppose the model I have outlined has something going for it; if one wishes to reject 
it, an alternative account of Kant’s views on the scope of conscious awareness, motion, 
perception and so on would be needed. What are its consequences for nonconceptualism? 
 First, we have a better grip on the relation between animals and humans. As stated in 
§1, I remain neutral on how exactly the content of animal intentionality is to be understood, 
for example whether it is Russellian. But what we are dealing with is something more than 
mere sensation, which is deliberately placed on a lower level of Kant’s ‘ladder’ 
(KrV:A320/B376; Log:64–5). Instead, the animal’s engagement with the world includes a 
conscious and unconscious representation of spatial entities within what Allais neatly calls an 
‘egocentric frame of reference or phenomenal field’.4 The dog sees the bowl as to its left and 
nearer than the wall; he then focuses in on its parts, perhaps the dark coloured portion which 
he associates with food. In humans, the situation is more complex. Just as with the dog, our 
act of shifting the scope of conscious awareness to become aware of the parts of an empirical 
intuition necessarily generates an awareness of succession. Unlike the dog, however, those 
acts are governed by concepts: we possess ‘rules for apprehension’ (KrV: A103–4; Refl.557). 
In short, the very same basic framework that underlies empirical intuitions, perception, 
succession, in the human case also underlies the nonconceptual intentionality of animals; the 
far reaching and important differences between the two cases, such as concept possession, 
need to be seen against the backdrop of these shared structures. One way to express this is by 
distinguishing two notions of consciousness. The motion of non-rational subjects makes 
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intuitional states conscious in the sense exemplified by the Anthropology’s example of seeing 
the man at a distance and then gradually becoming conscious of the parts of his face. In 
rational beings, the manner in which we become conscious of the world is inter-defined with 
a second order capacity to become ‘conscious of’ our own representations, i.e. to be self-
conscious or apperceptive. This does not mean, of course, that we typically go round thinking 
about representations; the claim is rather that when I become conscious of the table, I have a 
second order awareness of the marks of that intuition as standing in various inferential 
relations, relations which I recognise are not simply a matter of my own psychological 
history, but are instead presumptively grounded in the thing and so presumptively valid for 
others agents too (KrV:A106,A126,B142, A197/B242-3; GMS:412; Refl.663).
5
 But such 
concepts operate within the same underlying framework of intuition, attention, shifts of 
conscious awareness, inner sense etc. 
 Second, we have a clearer view of how nonconceptual synthesis might work. Animal 
intentionality is based on the interaction between apprehensive synthesis and associative 
reproduction. This is because there must be some mechanism for allowing the successive 
intuitions generated by shifts in attention to inform each other – otherwise, they would simply 
lie ‘dispersed and separate in the mind’ (KrV:A120). In animals, this mechanism is 
associative imagination (KrV:A120). As Kant puts it, ‘if I consider myself as an animal’, 
representations: 
[C]ould still carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as connected according to 
empirical laws of association.
6
 
In rational agents, as I discuss in §4, there is a more sophisticated unifying mechanism in play 
– namely, the understanding.  
 Before getting to that, however, it is worth comparing my position with two 
prominent alternatives: Tolley’s and Waxman’s. I’ll take these in turn. 
 Tolley defends a version of nonconceptualism on which, whilst there are 
nonconceptual intuitions, there is no nonconceptual synthesis (Tolley 2013). I absolutely 
agree with Tolley that there can be an intuitive intentional content which is not the product of 
synthesis: this is the ‘absolute unity’ of A99 (Tolley 2013:122). But I disagree with Tolley on 
four issues. First, I regard this as an exceptional limit case. Both apprehension and 
association are basic activities, characteristic of a primitive capacity for investigating the 
world. I thus disagree with Tolley’s view that nonsynthetic intentionality is the only form of 
nonconceptual representation recognised by Kant (Tolley 2013:121-2). Second, Tolley’s 
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rejection of nonconceptual synthesis forces him to equate perception, as it figures in the 
discussion of apprehension in A99, with the type of reflective, second order awareness 
characteristic of Kantian concepts (Tolley 2013:110; 123-4). This intellectualist gloss on 
perception clashes directly with texts such as Log:64–5 and KrV:A320/B376-7 where the 
term clearly means merely conscious awareness. Another way to put the point is that Tolley’s 
reading conflates the weak sense of ‘consciousness’ discussed in the previous paragraph with 
the strong, apperceptive sense. Third, Tolley states that his rejection of nonconceptual 
synthesis is based on passages such as KrV:B130 where Kant states that ‘all combination is 
an action of the understanding’ (Tolley 2013:121-2). But it is going too far to say such 
remarks ‘stifle any hope for carving out space for a kind of synthesis that does not involve 
concepts’ (Tolley 2013:122). One option is to stress that Kant is here defining 
‘understanding’ in opposition to sensibility. Since sensibility is that which is purely passive 
(KrV:A51/B75), it is possible that ‘understanding’ is being used broadly to encompass any 
active rearrangement of the manifold, and not just the sophisticated forms of such 
characteristic of rational agents – so, for example, A120 identifies the imagination as ‘an 
active faculty’. Another option is to accept that ‘understanding’ at B130 does indeed refer to 
conceptual awareness, but to argue that what Kant really means is that combination across all 
forms of content, including that of the sensible manifold, may be determined by the action of 
the understanding. Again, this is not special pleading: many passages show how hard Kant 
was finding it to articulate his views (consider the vacillations over the status of the 
imagination and synthesis at KrV:A78 and B130). Finally, there is strong evidence from 
other writings that Kant allows animals associative synthesis (for example, Br.Ak.11:52; V-
MP-L1/Pölitz:275-7; V-MP/Dohna:689–90). Assuming that we must deny animals the 
reflective and inferential capacities of the ‘I think’ (Anthr: 127) and thus concepts 
(KrV:A341/399), it follows that such synthesis must be nonconceptual. On balance, it thus 
seems right to recognise nonconceptual synthesis within Kant’s philosophy. What I have tried 
to show is how closely tied such synthesis is to his general theory of perception, of 
consciousness, and of the awareness of succession. 
 Turning to Waxman’s reading, there are again notable points of agreement: for 
example, I think he is right to present pure intuition as answering what is often known as the 
‘binding problem’, i.e. the question of how multiple sensory data streams can be united in a 
‘super-field’ (Waxman 2013:97).  I am also neutral on his distinctive appeal to a 
‘nondiscursive’ apperception, although I am wary as to whether we have a good enough grip 
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on this idea for it to do real explanatory work (Waxman 2013:141). But he and I disagree on 
three fundamental points. First, Waxman sees sensibility, considered in abstraction from 
concepts, as radically impoverished. In the absence of concepts: 
[S]ensibility contributes neither order nor relation to the manifolds of space and time, 
it can do nothing to differentiate and determine each space and each time. (Waxman 
2013:11) 
The result is what he describes as Kant’s ‘self-created problem’, namely that: 
[E]xperience itself would be impossible if the sensible existents encountered in it 
were devoid of all spatial and temporal differentiation and determination; and since 
this is precisely what they lack given only the unity of sensibility made possible by 
pure sensible intuition, this want must be made good by pure understanding, by means 
of its pure concepts, or not at all. (Waxman 2013:368) 
I agree that without conceptual capacities one cannot enjoy the experience in the thick sense 
of ‘cognition’, nor represent ‘objects’ where that notion is defined in terms of rules 
(Waxman: 2013:364). But it appears that Waxman also endorses the stronger view that 
sensibility by itself is unable to present relations such as egocentric distance, or to sustain the 
differentiation of items by spatio-temporal position: this alone makes sense of his talk of 
nonconceptualised appearances as ‘devoid of all spatial and temporal differentiation and 
determination’. Yet that strong view renders it impossible to understand the behaviour of 
animals, which are evidently capable of distinguishing and tracking the closer of two food 
sources. Second, I believe that Waxman misidentifies the role of apprehension. For him, 
apprehension generates these impoverished appearances, ‘devoid of all relation among 
themselves’: this is his explicit gloss on Kant’s claim at KrV:A120  that its outputs are 
‘dispersed and separate’(Waxman 2013:150). But Kant’s point is more subtle. The outputs of 
apprehension typically include intuitions with relational spatial content: the dog sees ‘at a 
glance’ the intruder by the door (KU:254). Such intuitions are dispersed only because shifts 
in conscious awareness generate, as described above, an experience of succession. Third, 
Waxman places an impossible burden on the understanding.   
[O]nly by grasping how very little Kantian sensibility is able to set in place ahead of 
the understanding can one hope to appreciate the hugeness of the void the latter is 
obliged to fill by means of its pure concepts. (Waxman: 2013:118 – original 
emphasis) 
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Suppose I perceive two pillars: why do I intuit them beside each other and not behind one 
another? It surely cannot be the understanding’s task to determine this: the categories are 
compatible with either option. Dialectically, it is striking that Waxman justifies this as 
necessary for the success of the Deduction: granting such an extensive role to understanding 
constitutes ‘Kant’s sole and entire warrant’ for ‘the objective validity of the categories’ 
(Waxman: 2013:372). As I will show in §§3-4, however, this is not the case. 
 To complete the overall story of this section, my discussion of empirical intuitions, 
would need supplementation by a treatment of space and time as pure intuitions. That is, 
unfortunately, beyond this article, but one can see how that chapter might be told. Animals 
would have a primitive awareness of the pure forms within which individual empirical 
intuitions occur. This primitive awareness could be cashed in terms of open-ended motor 
intentional dispositions: insofar as the prey keeps running left, the animal will keep running 
left. Rational agents alone are able to develop more sophisticated representations of space and 
time as a whole, such as Newtonian mechanics. 
 Kant’s ‘general theory’ as set out here generates certain systemic limitations on 
intuitive content – crudely, the price of shifts in conscious awareness is that the relevant 
intuitions are given as successive and thus ‘dispersed and separate in the mind’ (KrV:A120). 
To remedy this, some ‘combination...is therefore needed’ (KrV:A120). I now turn to the 
distinctive combinatorial capacities of rational agents. 
 
3. Transition to the Deduction and the Principles 
This section introduces the relationship between the categories, the principles and 
nonconceptualism. I first make explicit some methodological assumptions, and then offer 
some preliminary remarks about the Deduction. 
 It is a familiar point that many Kantian texts admit of both conceptualist and 
nonconceptualist readings. For example, the famous dictum that ‘intuitions without concepts 
are blind’ supports conceptualism if ‘blind’ is read as ‘lacking intentional content’ 
(Falkenstein 1995:58). For nonconceptualists, however, the point becomes clear a few lines 
later when Kant states that only from the union of understanding and intuition can cognition 
arise: ‘blind’ thus simply means ‘falling short of the higher standards required for cognition’ 
where cognition implies both intuitions and concepts (Hanna 2011:405). More generally, the 
nonconceptualist can always grant that high level achievements require conceptual capacities, 
whilst insisting that a state might nevertheless remain an empirical intuition despite falling 
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short of that standard. The same move is possible if one frames the debate in terms of 
‘objects’: there are texts which clearly invite a reading on which objectivity is separable from 
conceptuality, as the nonconceptualist believes. For example: 
To make a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of an object, is indeed 
the work of judgment; but the reference of an intuition to an object in general [die 
Beziehung der Anschauung auf ein Object überhaupt] is not. (Br.11:310–311). 
The question, of course, is how we should understand this notion of objectivity and how it 
relates to passages which align objects with rules and concepts (KrV:A201/B246)? Again one 
sees texts pushing both ways. The same point can even be made with respect to ‘cognition’ 
itself. Whilst the dominant usage in Kant’s work is undoubtedly one on which cognition 
requires both intuition and concepts, the Stufenleiter passage states that a cognition ‘is either 
an intuition or a concept [entweder Anschauung oder Begriff]’, phrasing which allows 
nonconceptualists like Hanna to claim that Kant is torn between a broad and narrow use of 
‘Erkenntnis’, with only the latter requiring conceptual capacities (Hanna 2005:256). To take 
one more case, passages such as KrV:A89-91/B122-3 are prima facie, clear endorsements of 
nonconceptualism. The issue is whether we should read them at face value or as mere 
possibilities that the Deduction ultimately shows to be incoherent (Hanna 2011:404-5; 
Griffith 2010:199). In short, the issue of Kantian nonconceptualism cannot be settled by any 
catalogue of texts since one’s stance on any specific passage will both form and be formed by 
one’s broader views on issues such as synthesis, the Deduction, the status of animals etc.  
 I now want to turn to the Deduction. I cannot mention, let alone treat, each aspect of 
Kant’s argument. Instead, I focus on one of its central aims, and one which is directly related 
to the question of nonconceptualism. The Deduction aims to establish the objective validity 
of the categories: more specifically, Kant aims to establish certain a priori, necessary and 
synthetic principles valid of ‘all objects of experience’ (KrV:B161). As a transcendental 
argument, the Deduction proceeds by demonstrating that these principles are a necessary 
condition for something (A783/B811). Let us call this something, whatever it is, Premise. 
Kant himself sometimes talks of Premise in terms of ‘experience’, sometimes in terms of 
‘objects’, but this alone does not advance matters since the nonconceptualist will simply 
claim that ‘experience’ and ‘objects’ here refer to sophisticated states, well beyond 
intentionality (so, for example, KrV:A106, B137). But the following can surely be agreed by 
all: it is a necessary condition on Kant’s argument being viable that Premise, whatever it is, is 
not itself more problematic than the categories. After all, the dialectical structure of Kant’s 
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transcendental argument requires that one begins from something which his opponents grant, 
and then progresses to some hitherto unnoticed condition of that. Furthermore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that those opponents to whom Kant is speaking include empiricists such 
as Hume (Prol:257; KrV:B168). The result is an adequacy condition on the Deduction: 
Premise must be something which such empiricists either accept or can be brought to accept 
comparatively easily.  
I will now sketch a simple proposal on which the Deduction, so read, remains entirely 
compatible with nonconceptualism: categorical synthesis is not necessary for empirical 
intuitions per se, but only for the representation of a special class of relations among such 
intuitions. In Kantian terms, they are necessary only for a certain mode of unification or 
synthesis.
7
 In short: 
The possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may come 
before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition, but rather as far as the laws 
of their combination are concerned…is to be explained. (KrV:B159-60, emphasis 
added) 
Specifically, I think that the categories provide a way to re-establish complex relations among 
the necessarily successive perceptions generated by apprehension, as discussed in §2. The 
same point can be expressed by distinguishing two senses of ‘object’.8 Kant’s system allows 
animals to perceive spatio-temporal particulars; such states thus have an ‘intentional object’ 
as that phrase is used in the phenomenological and analytic literature on the philosophy of 
mind. What I am denying is that they have an ‘object’ in the sense employed in texts such as 
KrV:A197/B242 where it functions as a term for those distinctive modes of categorical 
combination.
9
  
 To introduce this proposal, consider the case where it is most natural, the Second 
Analogy. In line with §2, Kant begins by stating that‘[t]he apprehension of the manifold is 
always successive’ (KrV:A189/B234). The question immediately arises as to how we are able 
to represent the difference between two relations: successive perception and perception of 
succession. Kant’s answer is that we must represent the latter as governed by some form of 
causal bond. This exhibits precisely the dialectical structure I noted: it is effective against the 
empiricist given the plausible assumption that she recognises our ability to at least represent 
the distinction between an event and a successive perception of two unchanged, 
simultaneously existing, objects – after all, debates between positivistic, projectivist and 
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sceptical realist accounts of the Treatise are debates over what must be added to events in 
order to generate causality.
10
 As Longuenesse observes: 
Kant maintains that some representation of causal relation, rather than resulting – as 
Hume claimed – from the repeated perception of generically identical successions of 
events, is presupposed in the very representation of any particular objective 
succession (Longuenesse 2005:143).
11
 
In the case of animals, in contrast, it seems more reasonable to speculate that they possess 
empirical intuitions, a series of images of a ship for example, while lacking precisely the 
ability to posit certain sophisticated relations among those images, relations such as the 
distinction between subjective and objective succession.
12
 In short, the success of the Second 
Analogy as an anti-empiricist transcendental argument is compatible with nonconceptualism. 
 As noted, the Second Analogy is a natural fit with my approach. But one might worry 
that this very naturalness is problematic.
13
 After all, many Kantians, irrespective of their 
views on conceptualism, might be sympathetic to what I have said about that particular text. 
There are two points to be made. First, there are commentators who explicitly state that 
categorical synthesis is a necessary condition on the empirical presentation of spatio-temporal 
particulars (Griffith 2010:194, Ginsborg 2008:70). Even the limited remarks made so far 
suggest that they are mistaken – the Second Analogy presents causality as necessary only for 
the representation of specialised relations between such particulars. Second, I begun with the 
Second Analogy because it is the easiest ground on which to run my proposal. As I discuss in 
§4, matters become really interesting when one expands it to the mathematical categories. 
 I have argued that this approach to the Deduction is compatible with 
nonconceptualism; animals may possess intuitive content in the complete absence of 
conceptual capacities. But it is important to stress, equally, the implications for the human 
case; insofar as humans represent the relevant relations, it follows that they necessarily 
deploy the categories. It is worth contrasting my approach to existing nonconceptualist 
attempts to accommodate the Deduction. Take the case of Allais: the fundamental difference 
between Allais and I concerns when and how the categories become necessary. She writes 
[T]he Deduction is specifically concerned with one aspect of cognition: the conditions 
under which we can apply concepts to objects in judgments…in the Deduction, he 
wants to show that a priori concepts are necessary conditions of being able to apply 
empirical concepts in empirical judgments. (Allais 2011:102, original emphasis) 
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Kant was certainly sometimes attracted to this approach (KrV:A111, A93/B126). 
Furthermore, Allais’s strategy has similarities to my own: both hold that the categories are 
necessary only for the representation of a ‘special kind of unity’ (Allais 2011:105). But there 
are crucial differences. For Allais the warrant for the application of the categories is that they 
are ‘the conditions under which we can apply concepts to objects in judgments’: the 
distinctive unity which the categories make possible is the unity characteristic of empirical 
concepts and related notions such as ‘property’ or ‘general feature’ (Allais 2011:103-4). As a 
result, Allais’s view faces two difficulties. First, it damages the Deduction as a transcendental 
argument. Hume will not accept the premise of Allais’s argument: he will argue, as Berkeley 
does, that there is no need to postulate anything like Kantian empirical concepts in the first 
place – all that is needed is a tendency to associate groups of particular images (Hume 
1978:1.1.7.7-8). Of course, Hume may be wrong about that. But my model shows the 
categories to be necessary for something that is not itself a philosophical hypothesis, but 
rather a basic datum of any recognisably human awareness of the world. ‘No one’, Kant 
states, will fail to recognise the difference between the ship and the house case 
(KrV:A190/B235); the sceptic might insist that we are universally mistaken, always seeing as 
successive what is really simultaneous, but she cannot deny plausibly that we have the 
resources to at least represent the distinction. Second, it hard to see why the categories should 
be ‘necessary conditions of being able to apply empirical in empirical judgments’ (Allais 
2011:102). Empirical concept formation certainly requires that objects and properties exhibit 
a reasonable degree of coherence (KrV:A100-1). But why should it require anything as strong 
as the existence of causal laws? Of course, there is a longstanding debate over the strength of 
arguments like the Analogies. My point is that Allais’s approach creates a structural problem 
insofar as it premises the categories on something bound to imply only a weaker result. One 
might respond by ‘thickening’ empirical concepts, but this will simply exacerbate the first 
difficulty: the more plausible it becomes that empirical concepts imply categorical order, the 
more the warranted application of those empirical concepts themselves becomes open to 
question. In sum, on my reading the categories are necessary for some achievement more 
basic than on Allais’s account; I return to this at the end of §4. 
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4. The Categories and Relational Synthesis: The Axioms 
The task now is to develop the proposal of §3: I use the example of the categories of quantity 
as detailed in the Axioms. I chose the Axioms for several reasons: it is, for example, appealed 
to by Griffith in defence of conceptualism.
14
 But the most important is that, whilst the text of 
the Axioms supports my claims, it also shows why Kant’s position has been misunderstood. 
Specifically, Kant is torn between two lines of argument, a problem rooted in the distinction 
between the mathematical and dynamical categories, and one which explains some of the 
textual issues that obscure his nonconceptualism. 
 The Axioms aims to demonstrate that ‘[a]ll intuitions are extensive magnitudes’ 
(KrV:B202), or that ‘[a]ll appearances are, as regards their intuition, extensive magnitudes’ 
(KrV:A161). I use the former formulation, but I do not regard the two as differing 
significantly. Kant defines an extensive magnitude as follows: 
I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the parts makes 
possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter). 
(KrV:A162/B203) 
The issue in play is thus mereology. At the level of the pure forms of intuition, of course, the 
whole has priority over the parts (KrV:A22/B38). But here we are dealing with empirical 
intuitions, and Kant’s claim is that, in such cases, the representation of the parts has 
explanatory priority over the representation of the whole. Now, as stated, I believe Kant 
developed two very different arguments for this claim. I label these the ‘simple argument’ 
and the ‘complex argument’, and I address them in turn. 
 The simple argument is encapsulated in the text beginning the A Edition of the 
Axioms. 
I can represent no line to myself, no matter how small, without drawing it in thought, 
that is gradually generating all its parts from a point, and thereby first registering this 
intuition....[E]very appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as it can only be 
cognised through successive synthesis (from part to part) in apprehension. 
(KrV:A162-3/B203-4) 
If we can represent an empirical intuition only by successively moving from ‘part to part’, it 
immediately follows, as the Axioms claims, that the representation of the parts has 
explanatory priority over the representation of the whole. 
 This simple argument aims to build on the theory of perception discussed in §2: one 
sees the characteristic link between apprehension, i.e. changes in the scope of conscious 
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awareness, and the awareness of succession. But the simple argument is fatally flawed. First, 
no justification is given for the premise that we ‘can represent no line to myself, no matter 
how small, without…generating all its parts from a point’. It seems phenomenologically 
undeniable that I can at least sometimes see a whole line at a single glance. Second, the 
simple argument leaves spatial perception radically underdetermined. Suppose I successively 
perceive a series of points. Why should I take them to form a straight line, as opposed to a 
bent one, if I can never see the line as a whole? Yet if I can represent the line as a whole, then 
why couldn’t I do this prior to perceiving the parts? Third, the simple argument generates a 
regress since, given Kant’s other assumptions, any part is divisible and so must itself have 
been arrived at by a successive perception of its parts. Fourth, even if the argument were 
sound, it is unclear how it would link to the categories: no direct mention has been made of 
them. 
 The underlying problem is that the simple argument relies on an extreme version of 
the account of perception outlined in §2. The point there was that shifts in the scope of 
conscious awareness, for example when perceiving the parts of something, necessarily create 
an awareness of succession. But this is perfectly compatible with the fact that we can, and 
initially do, simply perceive objects without needing to ‘gradually generate’ their parts; as I 
discussed in §2, KU appeals to the ‘basic measure’ precisely to emphasise that one may intuit 
something instantaneously, in a single glance (KU:251;254).
15
 Nevertheless, the simple 
argument remains important because it explains an otherwise troubling aspect of the 
Deduction. If the simple argument worked, it would entail that any intuition was an extensive 
magnitude just in virtue of the way it is perceived, i.e. through a successive synthesis of its 
parts. The only difference between a human and an animal would then be that the former was 
additionally capable of reflecting on and recognising this fact. This, I suggest, is what Kant 
has in mind when he claims that the proof of the mathematical categories has a distinctive 
kind of ‘immediate evidence’ and ‘intuitive certainty’ (KrV:A160-2/B199-201). This same 
idea explains the prima facie conceptualist remarks found in §26 of the Deduction. For 
example: 
[A]ll synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under 
the categories. (KrV:B161) 
Clearly the nonconceptualist owes some account of this line. My suggestion is that it is driven 
by the simple argument, by the assumption that at least some categories might flow directly 
Sacha Golob (sacha.golob@kcl.ac.uk) 
Forthcoming in Kantian Review 
Preprint – Please Cite the Published Version  
 
19 
 
from the mere act of apprehension. But the simple argument is deeply flawed, and, as I now 
show, it does not reflect Kant’s considered position.  
 I now outline the second proof of the Axioms: the ‘complex argument’. The place to 
begin is §26 of the Deduction where Kant discusses the distinctive unity which the categories 
bring to perception: note that he is now talking specifically about himself, about human 
perception. 
If I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of 
its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition 
in general….This very same synthetic unity, however, if I abstract from the form of 
space, has its seat in the understanding and is the category of the synthesis of the 
homogenous in an intuition in general, i.e. the category of quantity, with which that 
synthesis of apprehension, i.e. the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing 
agreement. (KrV:B162) 
Kant is explaining here how the category can act as a ‘rule for apprehension’, a mechanism 
for unifying the necessarily successive and so ‘dispersed’ perceptions generated by 
apprehension (Refl.557; KrV:A120). This immediately involves a far more sophisticated 
apparatus than the simple argument: note the references to homogeneity and the category of 
quantity. The same applies to the B edition of the Axioms, where the representation of 
determinate spaces and times is explained in terms of: 
The composition of that which is homogenous…Now, the consciousness of the 
homogeneous manifold in intuition in general, insofar as through it the representation 
of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of a magnitude. (KrV:B203) 
I argued in §3 that the categories re-establish complex relations among the successive 
perceptions generated by apprehension. In the Analogies, those relations are objective 
succession and simultaneity. I will now argue that in the Axioms they are certain 
mereological relations. Suppose a dog sees a space X at t1: as described in KU, it intuits it at 
a single glance (KU:254). At t2-t5 it becomes successively conscious of the various parts of 
X, exactly as described in §2. Now, the animal may associate these parts with the house 
originally seen at t1: seeing one part brings to mind another. It may also react differently to 
different parts of an object: it licks only the corner of a bowl with food in. But what the 
animals lacks is the ability to see the parts as parts, just as it lacks the ability to see something 
as a door (SvF:59). It lacks this ability because representing that relation requires the 
categories of quantity: as Kant puts it, the concepts of part and whole lie under those 
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categories (V-MP/Volckmann:423). To understand this and complete the argument, we need 
to look to the Schematism. 
 In the Schematism, Kant explains the schema for quantity in terms of the concept of 
number.  
[T]he pure schema of magnitude, as a concept of the understanding, is number, a 
representation which compounds [zusammenbefaßt] the successive addition of unit to 
(homogeneous) unit. Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the 
manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time 
itself in the apprehension of the intuition. (KrV:A142–3/B182) 
I cannot address the general distinction between categories and their schemata, nor the issue 
of how exactly the three categories of quantity relate to the single schema of number.
16
 
Instead, my interest is in the basic claim that number allows the ‘compounding’ of a manifold 
of homogeneous units. In §2, I noted that Kant uses ‘basic measure’ to denote the scope of 
spatial consciousness at a given instant. But in rational beings, this same awareness play an 
additional role: it serves as ‘a measure or unity in estimating magnitude by numbers’ 
(KU:251). To see the relevance, suppose now that I see spatial extent X at t1. I perform the 
synthesis of apprehension, changing the scope of conscious awareness to generate a 
successive perception, t2-t5, of its smaller parts. So far this is just as with the dog. However, 
unlike the dog I possess the schema for number: I recognise the parts as ‘homogeneous 
intuitions’, i.e. I recognise them as falling under a common concept (V-MP-
K3E/Arnoldt:991–2). Specifically, I am able to take X and use it as a numerical base in terms 
of which the subsequent intuitions are conceptualised: X is thus the ‘basic measure’ in both of 
the senses just noted. So at t1 I represent a space as being size X, at t2 one as being size half 
X, at t3 one as being some small but indeterminate portion of X and so on. Now, to see the 
successive perceptions in these terms just is to represent mereological relations among them: 
for example, I can recognize that if I sum together the various parts it yields the original 
whole X. This ‘summing together’ is what the Schematism refers to as the act of 
‘compounding’ made possible by the schema number. Recall: 
[T]he pure schema of magnitude, as a concept of the understanding, is number, a 
representation which compounds the successive addition of unit to (homogeneous) 
unit. (KrV:A142–3/B182; similarly A103) 
It is this compounding of homogeneous units, i.e. successive parts conceptualised in terms of 
an original extent that serves as a numerical base, that animals cannot achieve. Whilst an 
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image of one part may bring to their mind an image of the whole, they are unable to represent 
the fact that the whole is constituted out of those parts.
17
 They are unable to do this because 
they lack the relevant a priori schema, number. Thus the 1793 Prize essay: 
[T]he representation of a composite, as such, is not a mere intuition, but requires the 
concept of a composition [Zusammensetzung]...that is not abstracted from 
intuitions…but is a basic concept, and a priori at that. (FM:271) 
Similarly in a 1792 letter: 
Composition [Zusammensetzung] itself cannot be given by means of mere intuition 
and its apprehension, but only through the self-active combination of the 
manifold…this combination and its function must be subject to rules a priori in the 
mind. (Br.Ak.11:376). 
In demonstrating these results, Kant validates the headline claim of the Axioms, that all 
intuitions are extensive magnitudes. But by itself that headline risks oversimplifying matters. 
What the Axioms actually shows is that, for any intuition, it is possible, given the schema for 
number, to recognise that it is composed by the sum of its parts.  
 I now turn to some objections to my view. First, one might counter that if a dog may 
perceive one item as to the left of another, surely it can perceive one space, such as the couch, 
within a larger space, such as the room, and so it can represent mereological relations. I am 
happy to grant this. My claim is not that any representation involving parts and wholes 
relation depends on the categories; the Aesthetic entails that even the ability to perceive 
empirical intuitions is in some sense dependent on an ability to represent space and time as 
wholes. Rather, my claim is that rational agents alone are able to represent the whole as 
constituted or composed by the sum of its parts. This is vital since it is a necessary condition 
on being disposed to believe certain very basic claims. Such claims include: if I replace a part 
with one of the same size, then the size of the whole will be unaffected; if double the size of 
all parts, then the size of the whole will double; if one part is removed whole, then the size of 
the whole will be reduced by the size of that part. In short, composition is an a priori concept 
as claimed in the Prize essay. I say more on how common these dispositions are in response 
to the third objection below. 
 Second, one might question whether the proposal satisfies the demands imposed on 
the Deduction in §3? The key issue here is balance: Kantian transcendental arguments need 
premises thin enough to be accepted by his opponents, but thick enough to yield substantive 
conclusions. Have I got the balance right? Is the part-whole relation I have identified both 
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sophisticated enough that we can imagine an animal intentionality which lacks it, thus 
supporting nonconceptualism, and yet simple enough that it is assumed by Kant’s empiricist 
opponents? The first conjunct is easily met: it is unproblematic to imagine a dog exhibiting 
differential reactions to the parts of an object, associating them together and yet lacking the 
notion of composition. But what of the second? Both Locke’s and Hume’s views on 
mereology are notoriously complex, and I cannot offer a full treatment of them here. But I 
can do enough to make the point. Consider, for example, this remark from the Treatise: 
There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine 
concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, 
that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible. (Hume 
1978:1.2.3.12, emphasis added).  
‘Compounding’ here is precisely the ability to represent multiple subparts as constituting a 
larger spatial whole; i.e. exactly that ability which the ‘complex argument’ of the Axioms 
shows is dependent upon the category of number. The result is that one can be a 
nonconceptualist and retain the core aim of the Deduction: namely, to provide a revolutionary 
rationalist response to empiricist sceptics.  
 Third, one might wonder if my account is really better off than that of Allais? I argued 
that Allais’s reading of the Deduction was premised on something that Kant’s opponents 
would not accept, namely empirical concepts. But why don’t the dispositional capacities I am 
assuming face the same problem – after all, they sound like inferential abilities? Another way 
to put the point: even if Hume himself recognised an act of compounding, why can’t the 
empiricist simply surrender that assumption? My response to both points is that the empiricist 
can plausibly reject explanatory hypotheses: he can, for example, reject the hypothesis that 
our treatment of instances of a given type is informed by a generic representation, such as a 
Kantian empirical concept, rather than a series of associated particular images. He can thus 
reject Allais’s premise as discussed in §3. But the empiricist cannot reject basic first order 
data about human abilities, such as an ability to even represent the distinction between 
subjective and objective succession, between seeing the parts of a house one after another, 
and seeing a ship sailing downstream.  Likewise, it is an unproblematic and everyday datum 
that normally functioning, adult humans do possess the dispositional abilities I emphasise: for 
example, a disposition to believe that if double the size of all parts, then the size of the whole 
will double. Whilst perhaps not quite as obvious as the house/ship case, the presence of such 
dispositions can be established by empirical testing at a comparatively young age (I make no 
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commitment as to exactly when – the issue is well modelled by developmental psychology 
experiments in which children play with blocks).
18
 Of course, the empiricist could simply dig 
her heels in and insist that we still don’t in fact possess those abilities, just as she could insist 
we aren’t able to even represent any difference between the house and ship cases. But in so 
doing empiricism collapses into a merely dogmatic scepticism, which Kant has neither 
obligation nor ambition to refute. In Hume’s own case, he would also have to abandon his 
classically empiricist attempt to explain our representation of space and times as wholes in 
terms of the sum of their parts. 
 Let me summarise the position reached. First, Kant is a nonconceptualist in that he 
allows for empirical intuitions in the complete absence of conceptual capacities; such 
intentionality is characteristic, for example, of animals. Second, I have sought to 
accommodate some of the motivations for reading Kant as a conceptualist. In particular, in 
the case of normally functioning, adult humans, empirical intuitions are necessarily 
accompanied by categorical synthesis. I have also offered an explanation as to why at least 
some passages suggest a cruder and more straightforward conceptualism picture, for example 
the first Edition of the Axioms.
19
  
 
Notes 
1
 This definition is in line with that used by Allais 2009:384. 
2
 All references are to Kant 1902 using the following abbreviations: 
Anth: Anthropologie… (Ak.7); Br: Briefe (Ak.10–13); FM: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte . . . 
(Ak.20); KrV: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Ak.4); KU: Kritik der Urteilskraft (Ak.5); Log: Logik (Ak.9); NG: 
Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen…(Ak.2); Prol: Prolegomena (Ak.4); Refl.:Reflexion (Ak.16); SvF: 
Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit…(Ak.2); V-MP/Dohna: Metaphysik Dohna (Ak.28); V-MP-L1/Pölitz: Metaphysik L1 
Pölitz (Ak.28); V-MP/Volckmann: Metaphysik Volckmann (Ak.28); V-MP-K3E/Arnoldt: Metaphysik K3 
Arnoldt (Ak.29). I have consulted, although often modified, the translations in Kant 1991. 
3
 ‘Consciousness’ (Bewuβtsein) is thus primarily a phenomenological term, identifying a form of qualitative 
awareness: a conscious representation is one that is ‘illuminated’ (Anth:135). Unconscious intuitions retain their 
representational structure but are ‘obscure’ with the result that we need to infer to our possession of them rather 
than having an immediate phenomenological awareness of such (Anth:135; NG:191).  
4
 Allais 2009:408. 
5
 It is because of this ambiguity that some pre-Critical texts (for example, LM 28:689–90), deny animals 
‘consciousness’ (for helpful discussion see McLear 2011). 
6
 Br.Ak.11:52. 
7
 The reference to ‘relations’ includes more than the three relational categories; my use thus mirrors Kant’s own 
distinction between ‘the synthetic unity of the manifold’ and the individual category of unity (KrV:B131). 
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8
 I do not think that the Gegenstand/Objekt distinction maps this divide, nor do I think that Kant deploys that 
distinction with any real uniformity (here I agree with Longuenesse 1998:111). 
9
 As detailed in §3, a similar distinction between two senses of ‘object’ is made by Allais – but the substance of 
my position is very different. 
10
 Without this assumed ability to identify objective succession, the Humean world would collapse into 
incoherence. Suppose I repeatedly see two doors, A and B, as I walk upstairs, and that I then see the same doors 
in the reverse order whenever I walk back down: without a capacity to recognise them as simultaneously 
existing, which for Hume is of course still delivered by imagination (Hume 1978:1.2.4.24), I would be forced to 
regard A and B as both cause and effect of each other.  
11
 I differ from Longuenesse, however, on the key issue of animals (Longuenesse 1998:208n).  
12
 One might argue that an animal can draw this distinction via its proprioceptive feeling of bodily motion. I am 
sympathetic to this, but it marks a fundamental departure from a Kantian approach: it suggests that one might 
recognise an event without seeing it as caused simply by bodily orientation.  
13
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this. 
14
 Griffith 2010:213-4. 
15
 Kant is often criticised for an implausible ‘data atomism’ (Beck 1978:144). KU shows this is unfair; but the 
simple argument explains the charge. 
16
 I agree that ‘it is clear that the concept of magnitude is in some way intended to play the role of all three 
quantitative categories’ (Sutherland 2004:432). 
17
 To be precise, my claim is not that possession of the schema for number is itself sufficient for this special 
representation of the whole but rather that it is necessary: in particular, one will need a sophisticated ability to 
re-identify spatial locations over time, something that is made possible by the schema for substance. One sees 
here how interlinked the various Kantian categories are, with each contributing one aspect to a unified picture of 
rational, sensible cognition; treatment of substance is, however, beyond this paper. 
18
 There is a large experimental literature on these issues, often influenced by Piaget; for a recent overview 
focussing on block play and the presence or absence of the relevant skills in three year olds see Verdine et al 
2013. 
19
 I am very grateful to Lucy Allais, John Callanan, Colin McLear, Dennis Schulting, Nick Stang, and Clinton 
Tolley for discussion and comments on this material. I am also indebted to the Editor, Prof. Aquila, and to two 
anonymous referees for their extremely helpful remarks on an earlier draft. 
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